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I.       Whether Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force extends beyond initial 
seizure? 
 
II.       If the Court were to apply a rule of continuing seizure to the Fourth Amendment 
protection against the use of excessive force, to what point beyond initial seizure 







































TABLE OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………………..iv 
OPINIONS BELOW………………………………………………………………………………1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION………………………………………………………………1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES…………………………………………1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE……………………………………………………………………1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS……………………………………………………………4 
ARGUMENTS 
       STANDARD OF REVIEW…………………………………………………………...5 
I.       FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST EXCESSIVE  
FORCE EXTENDS BEYOND INITIAL SEIZURE………………………………….6 
 
A. A “Continuing Seizure” Approach Conforms to This Court’s  
Precedent and Upholds the Language and Spirit of the Fourth  
Amendment……………………………………………………………………6 
 
B.       The Majority of Circuit Courts Have Adopted a “Continuing  
Seizure” Doctrine Applying the Fourth Amendment’s Objective 
      Reasonableness Test to the Use of Force by Police Officers After  
      the Initial Arrest……………………………………………………………….8 
 
II.       THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST  
UNREASONABLE SEIZURE EXTENDS AT LEAST UNTIL AN  
ARRESTEE HAS BEEN ARRAIGNED OR FORMALLY CHARGED…………..10 
 
A. Radley’s Status at the Moment Excessive Force Was Used Does  
Not Fall under This Court’s Definition of Pretrial Detainee, So His  
Claim Is Best Analyzed Under a Fourth Amendment Standard……………..10 
 







C. The “Arresting Officer” Rule Is Arbitrary and Unprecedented in  
This Court’s Jurisprudence, and Therefore Should Not be Utilized  
When Determining an Arrestee’s Constitutional Rights…………………….12 
 
D. A Bright-line Rule Extending Fourth Amendment Protection Until  
Arraignment Would Provide a Workable Standard to Guide Police  
Officers as to What Type of Force They Can Use and When They 
Can Use It……………………………………………………………………14 
 
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………..15 




















TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES                                PAGE(S) 
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)…………………………………………………………12 
Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2004)…………………………………………..8, 11, 13 
Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1991)………………………………………….8, 13 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)………………………………………………………….9, 10 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)…………………………………………6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1988)………………………………………...12, 13 
Pierce v. Multnomah, 76 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1996)……………………………………………..13 
Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1989)………………………………………...8, 12, 13 
Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997)……………………………………………….9, 10 
Tennessee v. Gardner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)……………………………………………………..7, 13 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)………………………………………………………………….7 
Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1990)…………………………………………………10 
United States. v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 1997)………………………………………...8 
Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993)……………………………………………...9 
Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989)…………………………………………………9, 10 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV……………………………………………………………………………..6 
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII………………………………………………………………………...…6 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1………………………………………………………………………7 
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006)……………………………………………………………………….1 




Erica Haber, Demystifying a Legal Twilight Zone: Resolving the Circuit Court Split  
on when Seizure Ends and Pretrial Detention Begins in § 1983 Excessive Force  




 The opinion for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Fair is 
unreported but may be found in the Record at R. 11-13. 
 The opinion for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth Circuit is likewise 
unreported but may be found in the Record at R. 16. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 The court of appeals entered judgment on March 15, 2010.  (R. at 16).  Petitioner filed his 
petition for writ of certiorari on May 15, 2010.  (R. at 17).  This Court granted the petition on 
October 7, 2010.  (R. at 18).  This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 The Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 are reproduced in an Appendix to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The facts that serve as the basis for this action are as alleged in the February 1, 2009 
Complaint (R. at 2-4) and are not contested for purposes of ruling on the legal issues presented.  
Cf. R. at 11-12 (factual allegations as set forth in the Complaint are accepted as true by the 
District Court for purposes of ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss).   
On September 23, 2008, Petitioner Beau Radley (Radley) was driving home from a 
business meeting along Highway X in Fair County.  (R. at 3).  During that drive, Radley was 
pulled over by John Marlin (Marlin), a police officer employed by Respondent Fair County 
Police Department (Fair County).  Id.  Marlin, alleging that Radley was driving drunk, insisted 
that Radley take a breathalyzer test.  Id.  Radley refused the test and was taken into custody by 
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Marlin.  Id.  Marlin handcuffed Radley’s hands behind his back, and Radley was put into the 
back seat of Marlin’s squad car.  Id.  Marlin then took Radley to the Fair Police Station.  Id. 
Upon arrival at the police station, Radley was escorted by Marlin into the booking room 
and handed off to Respondent Arthur Goode (Goode), a police officer also employed by the Fair 
County Police Department.  Id.  Marlin left the booking room and left Radley in the sole custody 
of Goode.  Id.  Radley’s arms were still handcuffed behind his back.  Id.  Upon Marlin’s exit, 
Goode called Radley “scum” and “white trash,” to which Radley gave no response.  Id.  Radley’s 
handcuffs were removed by Goode for the booking process and, upon completion, were recuffed 
too tightly.  Id.  Radley complained to Goode that the handcuffs were too tight.  Id.  Goode did 
nothing to fix the handcuffs.  Id.   
At this point, Marlin returned to the booking room.  Id.  Radley complained to Marlin 
that the handcuffs were too tight, and Marlin checked and then loosened the handcuffs.  Id.  
Goode then escorted Radley, whose hands were still handcuffed behind his back, from the 
booking room to a holding cell.  Id.  This entire time Radley was again in the sole custody of 
Goode.  Id.  In the holding cell, Goode pushed Radley to the ground and hit Radley in the back 
with his knee.  Id.  Goode told Radley that he “shouldn’t have embarrassed [Goode].”  Id.  
Goode threatened that if he had come back, he would make Radley “regret it.”  Id.   
Hours later, when Radley was certain that Goode was off duty, Radley complained about 
his injuries to one of the officers on duty and was taken to the Fair County Hospital for 
examination.  Id.  Radley sustained bruising around his wrists from the handcuffs placed on him 
by Goode, as well as a cut lip and bruising along his jaw from being pushed to the ground while 
his hands were still handcuffed behind his back.  (R. at 4).   
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 On February 1, 2009, Radley filed a complaint against Goode and Fair County in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Fair alleging that Respondents’ use of 
excessive force violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as enforced by 42 U.S.C 
§1983 (2006).  (R. at 2-4).  On February 13, 2009, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the 
Fourth Amendment component of Radley’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.  (R. at 5-7).  In their motion to dismiss, Respondents argued 
that Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to arrestees, such as Radley, who have 
completed the booking process.  (R. at 5).  Respondents also argued that even if the Fourth 
Amendment continues to protect beyond the initial seizure, it cannot continue once an arrestee, 
like Radley, is no longer in the custody of the arresting officer.  (R. at 6).   
On March 1, 2009, Radley filed a memorandum in opposition to Respondents’ motion to 
dismiss.  (R. at 8-10).  In his memorandum, Radley argued that the Fourth Amendment 
protection extends at least until an arrestee, like Radley, has been arraigned of formally charged.  
(R. at 9).   
On March 12, 2009, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Fair, the 
Honorable Candice Gorder, USDJ, granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss.  (R. at 11-13).  The 
District Court found that the Fourth Amendment protection continues beyond the initial seizure, 
but that such protection extends only while the arrestee, such as Radley, remains in the custody 
of the arresting officer.  (R. at 13).   
 On April 1, 2009, Radley filed a notice of appeal with the District Court.  (R. at 14).  On 
April 14, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth Circuit granted Radley’s 
appeal to address the question of whether the Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to an arrestee who is no longer in the custody of the 
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arresting officer but has yet to be arraigned or formally charged.  (R. at 15).  On March 15, 2009, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the 
judgment of the District Court.  (R. at 16).   
On May 15, 2010, Radley filed his petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court.  (R. at 
17).  On October 7, 2010, this Court granted Radley’s petition for Writ of Certiorari to address 
the following issues: (1) Whether Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force extends 
beyond initial seizure; and (2) If the Court were to apply a rule of continuing seizure to the 
Fourth Amendment protection against the use of excessive force, to what point beyond initial 
seizure should that protection extend?  (R. at 18).   
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. 
 This Court in Graham v. Connor articulated that a Fourth Amendment standard governs a 
free citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making 
an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of his person.  However, the question of whether 
the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with protection against the deliberate 
use of excessive physical force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention 
begins was expressly left unanswered.  Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force 
clearly extends beyond the initial seizure.  This Court has previously defined “seizure” as 
occurring when, by means of physical force or show of authority, government actors have in 
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.  An arrestee awaiting arraignment certainly falls 
under this definition.  Interpreting this Court’s decision accordingly, a majority of the circuit 
courts of appeal, including the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case, have adopted a 
Fourth Amendment “continuing seizure” protection against the use of excessive force, holding 
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that “seizure” extends beyond the point of arrest.   Such an interpretation is most in keeping with 
this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
II. 
 Fourth Amendment protection extends at least until an arrestee has been arraigned or 
formally charged.   In Graham, this Court made clear that a pretrial detainee is protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  However, pretrial detainee status does not begin until post-arraignment, 
while the individual is awaiting trial.  An arrestee awaiting arraignment who has yet to be given 
the opportunity to appear before a judicial officer for a probable cause determination retains his 
Fourth Amendment protections.  As probable cause has yet to be determined, a more relaxed 
standard for excessive force is not appropriate for an arrestee.   To hold otherwise is contrary to 
the long standing value of presumed innocence and would violate a key component of our 
nation’s justice system.  Moreover, extending Fourth Amendment protection until arraignment 
provides a workable, bright-line rule, setting a clear standard for police officers when 
determining the level of force to use in varying situations.  By limiting Fourth Amendment 
protection to an arrestee only so long as that person is in the custody of the arresting officer, the 
Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals in this case erred.   
ARGUMENTS 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are 





I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST EXCESSIVE FORCE 
EXTENDS BEYOND INITIAL SEIZURE. 
 
A. A “Continuing Seizure” Approach Conforms to This Court’s Precedent and 
Upholds the Language and Spirit of the Fourth Amendment 
 
The Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals properly decided that the Fourth Amendment 
continues to protect arrestees beyond their initial seizure.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 confers a cause of 
action to those persons who have been deprived of their rights by another person acting under the 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, including claims of 
excessive force by police officers.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  In Graham v. Connor this Court 
held that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are not governed by a single generic 
standard.  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989).  Instead, this Court decided an analysis 
of a section 1983 claim begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed 
by the challenged application of force.  Id. at 394.  The Fourth and Eighth Amendments are the 
two primary sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive governmental 
conduct.  Id.  The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of the person.  U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV.  The Eighth Amendment bans cruel and unusual punishment.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. VIII.  Courts have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting citizens in the 
period between “seizure” and “punishment.”  See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, n.10.  The 
Constitutional protections against excessive force for a person arrested, detained, and then 
convicted vary depending on the person’s status.   Fourth Amendment protection applies to 
excessive force claims that arise in the context of an arrest, investigatory stop or other “seizure” 
of a free citizen.  Id. at 395.  Eighth Amendment protection applies to prisoners post-conviction.  
See id. at 394.  The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from 
the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.  Id. at 395 n.10.  The Fourteenth 
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  As the arrestee moves 
through the criminal justice system, his constitutional rights vary, as do the standards for judging 
his claims against excessive force.  A Fourth Amendment claim is judged by an “objective 
reasonableness” test, a Fourteenth Amendment claim under a “shocks-the-conscience” standard, 
and an Eighth Amendment inquiry turns on whether the force amounts to “unnecessary and 
wanton infliction of pain.”  See Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-99.  However, this Court expressly left 
undecided the question of whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with 
protection against the deliberate use of excessive force beyond the point at which arrest ends and 
pretrial detention begins.  Id. at 395 n.10. 
Petitioner Beau Radley’s excessive force claim falls under the Fourth Amendment’s 
umbrella.  In Terry v. Ohio this Court defined “seizure” as occurring when by means of physical 
force or show of authority, government actors have in some way restrained the liberty of a 
citizen.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).  This language implies that seizure is not an 
exact point in time, but a continuum relating to the time in which the liberty of the citizen is 
restrained.  Furthermore, this Court has extended “seizure” not only to when an officer arrests an 
individual, but also whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away.  
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).  At the time Radley’s excessive force claim arose, he 
did not have the freedom to walk away and therefore was still undergoing “seizure” when his 
excessive force claim arose.  Also, nowhere in the language of the Fourth Amendment is there a 
suggestion that a different standard for “unreasonableness” should apply when analyzing 
excessive force in a post-arrest situation versus pre-arrest conduct.   The letter of the Constitution 
does not provide for or imply such a distinction, and this Court should decide accordingly.  The 
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Fourth Amendment explicitly provides protection against the sort of physically intrusive 
governmental conduct to which Radley was exposed, and should therefore be the guide to 
analyzing excessive force claims arising during “seizure.”  See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
In Graham, the petitioner Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, brought a Section 1983 claim 
when law enforcement officers used physical force against him during the course of an 
investigatory stop.  Id. at 388.  During the investigatory stop, one of the officers shoved 
Graham’s face against the hood of the car, and four officers then grabbed Graham and threw him 
headfirst into the police car.  Id. at 389.  It reasonably follows from the facts of the case that 
Graham was already under the control of the police officers at the time the force occurred.  See 
Id.  This Court decided a Fourth Amendment standard was most appropriate for those 
circumstances.  See id. at 395.  By deciding to use a Fourth Amendment standard for a person 
already under the control of a police officer, this Court effectively employed a “continuing 
seizure” approach.   
B. The Majority of Circuit Courts Have Adopted a “Continuing Seizure” 
Doctrine Applying the Fourth Amendment’s Objective Reasonableness Test 
to the Use of Force by Police Officer After the Initial Arrest 
 
Since Graham, the majority of circuits deciding the issue, including, now, the Fifteenth 
Circuit, have adopted a “continuing seizure” doctrine applying the Fourth Amendment’s 
objective reasonableness test to the use of force by police officers after the initial arrest.  See, 
e.g., Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2010) (until a probable cause hearing); 
United States v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1997) (“seizure” is a continuum that 
can extend beyond the initial restraint); Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(until the arrestee’s first judicial hearing) Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(at least to arraignment and remains in custody of the arresting officer).   
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Very few courts have rejected the “continuing seizure” doctrine.  See, e.g., Riley v. 
Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 
1443 (5th Cir. 1993); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190,194 (7th Cir. 1989).  However, these cases 
can be distinguished and should not be followed in this case.  In Valencia, the court held that the 
Fourth Amendment test is inappropriate only when the official use of force occurs after the 
incidents of arrest are completed, after the plaintiff has been released from the arresting officer’s 
custody, and after the plaintiff has been in detention awaiting trial for a significant period of 
time.  Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1443-44.  In that case, the plaintiff’s excessive force claim arose 
during an incident that occurred three weeks after his arrest while he was still in detention 
awaiting trial.  Id. at 1442.  In the case at hand, Radley had only been in custody for a few hours 
when Goode used excessive force, a miniscule period of time as compared to Valencia.  A few 
hours in custody is not a significant period of time, so Radley’s Fourth Amendment rights had 
not expired, even under the Valencia standard, at the moment excessive force was used.  See id.  
Furthermore, the Valencia standard requires that the detainee be awaiting trial when his Fourth 
Amendment rights expire.  Id. at 1444.  Radley had not yet been arraigned or even formally 
charged at the time Goode used excessive force, so he was not “awaiting trial.” 
The Fourth Circuit in Riley, relied upon this Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520 (1979), claiming that Bell instructs the court to analyze excessive force under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Fourth Amendment.  Riley, 115 F.3d at 
1162.  However, this cannot be the case, as Graham, decided ten years after Bell, expressly 
declined to decide whether Fourth Amendment protection applies between arrest and pretrial 
detention.  See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.  Also, the plaintiff in Riley was arrested pursuant 
to a valid warrant, so probable cause had already been established.  See Riley, 115 F.3d at  1161.  
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Radley had not yet been arraigned, formally charged, nor had a probable cause hearing been held 
with regards to his arrest.  The Seventh Circuit decided Wilkins before this Court decided 
Graham.  Applying a now obsolete test, the court in Wilkins decided that the plaintiff, a person 
arrested but not charged or convicted, was protected by the Due Process Clause, not the Fourth 
Amendment.  See Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193.  However, one year later, and after Graham, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment will determine the standard of force on a person 
in custody most of the time.  See Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990). 
This Court should follow the trend of the United States Courts of Appeals and uphold the 
Fifteenth Circuit’s decision that the Fourth Amendment continues to protect arrestees beyond 
their initial seizure.  Such an interpretation is most in keeping with this Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE 
SEIZURE EXTENDS AT LEAST UNTIL AN ARRESTEE HAS BEEN 
ARRAIGNED OR FORMALLY CHARGED. 
 
A. Radley’s Status at the Moment Excessive Force Was Used Does Not Fall 
Under This Court’s Definition of Pretrial Detainee, So His Claim Is Best 
Analyzed Under a Fourth Amendment Standard. 
In Graham, this Court made clear that a pretrial detainee is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.  However, Radley was not a pretrial detainee when 
Goode used excessive force against him.  Pretrial detainee status does not begin until post-
arraignment, while the individual is awaiting trial.  Radley was arrested without a warrant, and 
had not yet been arraigned, formally charged, nor had a probable cause hearing been held on his 
behalf.  In Bell, this Court defined a pretrial detainee as one who has not been adjudged guilty of 
any crime, but only has had a judicial determination of probable cause.  See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. at 536. Radley had not yet had a judicial determination of probable cause, therefore he was 
not yet a pretrial detainee, and it is more appropriate to judge his claim by a Fourth Amendment 
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standard.  Radley, when struck by Goode, could best be classified as an arrestee.  As previously 
mentioned, the majority of circuit courts apply the Fourth Amendment, “objective 
reasonableness” standard to arrestees under the “continuing seizure” approach.  Therefore, as 
Radley does not fall under this Court’s definition of pretrial detainee, he is an arrestee and any 
excessive force claims made by an arrestee should be judged by the Fourth Amendment 
standard. 
B. A More Relaxed Force Standard Is Not Appropriate For an Individual Pre-
arraignment. 
After arrest the Fourth Amendment applies, after arraignment the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies, and after conviction the Eighth Amendment applies.  Each standard places a higher 
burden on the plaintiff than the preceding standard.  See Aldini, 609 F.3d at 864.  An arrestee 
protected by the Fourth Amendment must prove that the government agent’s use of force was 
objectively unreasonable, while under a Fourteenth Amendment claim, plaintiff must prove the 
use of force “shocks-the-conscience.”  See Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-94.  An individual being 
processed through the criminal justice system is subjected to an increasingly relaxed standard of 
force.  When arraignment and a probable cause hearing have yet to be performed, a more relaxed 
standard for force is not appropriate.  To hold otherwise is contrary to the long established 
presumption of innocence and would violate a key component of our nation’s justice system.  
Additionally, establishing the line between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protection at 
the probable cause hearing or arraignment creates an incentive to hold the hearing as soon as 
possible, which is certainly beneficial to the judicial process as it would minimize the time a 
presumptively innocent individual spends in jail.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 867. 
In Albright v. Oliver, this Court, deciding whether a Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment 
right is violated when a citizen is arrested without probable cause, held the petitioner’s Fourth 
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Amendment right to freedom from seizure was the violated constitutional right.  Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).  Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion, employed the 
“continuing seizure” approach and argued that a person is effectively seized until trial, because 
such a person is “scarcely at liberty” during the pretrial period.  Id. at 279 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring).  Even though Albright did not involve an excessive force claim, it is clear Justice 
Ginsburg sought to extend Fourth Amendment protection of an arrestee until trial, due to the fact 
that his liberty is still being restrained by the state.    
C. The “Arresting Officer” Rule Is Arbitrary and Unprecedented in This 
Court’s Jurisprudence, and Therefore Should Not be Utilized When 
Determining an Arrestee’s Constitutional Rights. 
The Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the “arresting officer” rule, thus holding 
that the Fourth Amendment protection extends only while the arrestee remains in the custody of 
the arresting officer.  The court based its decision on the standards set out in the Second and 
Sixth Circuits.  See, e.g., Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (Fourth 
Amendment standard should probably apply until arraignment, and remains in the custody of the 
arresting officer); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988) (Fourth Amendment 
seizure continues while the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers).  However, 
whether the arrestee is in the custody of the arresting officer is not the proper standard for the 
Fourth Amendment protection.  There is nothing in the language of the Constitution or in this 
Court’s precedent that makes a distinction in the application of Constitutional rights on the basis 
of whether an individual remains in the custody of the arresting officer.  Furthermore, the Sixth 
Circuit has since applied a Fourth Amendment standard to arrestees detained following a 
warrantless arrest prior to a probable cause hearing, regardless of whether arrestee was in the 
custody of the arresting officer.  Aldini, 609 F.3d at 867. 
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Also, it seems the circuit courts that have looked to the “arresting officer” as a guideline 
for determining the extent of seizure, did not intend to make it the delimiting point for seizure in 
all situations of arrest.  In Powell and McDowell, looking to the custody of the arresting officer 
was appropriate in each case because each plaintiff was in the custody of the arresting officer at 
the time the alleged excessive force occurred.  See Powell, 891 F.2d at 1041; McDowell, 863 
F.2d at 1304.  Therefore, the circumstance of the arrestee remaining in the custody of the 
arresting officer should not be considered the final inquiry as to whether the Fourth Amendment 
continues to protect such an arrestee.    
Moreover, in Garner, this Court held that “seizure” occurs not only when an officer 
arrests an individual, but also whenever that officer restrains the individual’s freedom to walk 
away.  Garner, 471 U.S. at 7.  An arrestee remaining in the custody of the arresting officer is not 
necessary for that arresting officer to continue to restrain the arrestee’s freedom to walk away.  
When an arresting officer transfers custody to another officer temporarily or when the officer 
places the arrestee in a jail cell, that officer is still restricting the movement and freedom of the 
arrestee.  Thus, the more appropriate standard is that embraced by the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits, which hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to a person arrested without warrants 
until a probable cause hearing is held.  See, e.g., Aldini, 609 F.3d at 867 (set the dividing line 
between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment zones of protection at the probable-cause 
hearing); Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996) (with a warrantless 
arrest, the Fourth Amendment extends until arrestee is released or a probable cause has been 
established); Austin, 945 F.2d at 1160 (Fourth Amendment applies to the treatment of arrestees 
detained without a warrant).  Since at the moment of excessive force Radley had been detained 
without a warrant and had not yet been arraigned, he was still protected by the Fourth 
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Amendment and, as such, has a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment as enforced by 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. 
D. A Bright-line Rule Extending Fourth Amendment Protection Until 
Arraignment Would Provide a Workable Standard to Guide Police Officers 
as to What Type of Force They Can Use and When They Can Use It. 
 
Adopting a “continuing seizure” approach which extends seizure until at least 
arraignment would provide police officers a delineation as to what type of force they can use and 
when they can use it.  Erica Haber, Demystifying a Legal Twilight Zone: Resolving the Circuit 
Court Split on when Seizure Ends and Pretrial Detention Begins in § 1983 Excessive Force 
Cases, 19 N.Y.L Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 939, 966 (2003).  Citizens should feel secure in their right to 
be free from excessive force, and police officers should be provided with a clear framework for 
the amount of force they are permitted to use in any given situation.  Such a clear, bright-line 
rule will provide both citizens and police officers a reasonable expectation of the amount of force 
police officers are permitted to use.  Armed with a proper guideline for appropriate force, police 
officers will adjust and implement the corresponding appropriate force in a particular situation.  
Hopefully, this will result in fewer lawsuits, relieving a small part of district courts already over-
crowded dockets.   
Extending seizure until arraignment provides a bright-line rule that would provide a 
workable standard for police officers.  Unlike the arresting officer rule, arraignment represents 
an important procedure in the criminal justice system where the accused is presented with his 
crime and a judicial officer reviews the probable cause.  An arraignment is evidence of the value 
our society places on the presumption of innocence.  It is also a set point in time which allows all 
parties to clearly understand the nature of the proceeding and the rights involved. 
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This Court should adopt a bright-line approach, extending seizure until arraignment, and 
reject the Fifteenth Circuit’s “arresting officer” approach.  This approach is most consistent with 
the presumption of innocence and this Court’s precedent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force extends beyond the initial 
seizure at least until an arrestee has been arraigned or formally charged.  For the aforementioned 
reasons, Petitioner Beau Radley urges this Court to affirm the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
as to the recognition of a “continuing seizure,” but reverse it as to its use of the “arresting 
officer” as the delimiting point, and direct that the case be remanded to the District Court for 
proceedings consistent with this Court’s order.   
       Respectfully submitted, 
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FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons of things to be seized. 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
 Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
 Section 1.  All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person or life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 
 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in 
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
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capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or 
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the 
District of Columbia.
 
